The question over the growing ‘Macedonian’ dispute is no longer whether a solution will be found in the immediate future. It now appears that it will not. The two sides are intransigent and the international community is being drawn more and more into what, for the time being, is a war of words. The question now is which side can afford to hang on longer without compromise, Greece or Yugoslav ‘Macedonia’? Who will break down first over the issue of changing or maintaining the name of ‘Macedonia’?
As neighboring former Yugoslav republics one by one become embroiled in civil strife, the western powers’ diplomats are trying to decide whether to lean in favor of Greece or the fragile new republic.
The dramatic domestic political developments here in April, climaxing with the dismissal of ‘hardline’ Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras, at first indicated that Athens was prepared to back down. Subsequent statements and developments indicate that this is not the case. The government, it would appear, is not even willing to accept a diluted version such as ‘New Macedonia’, a formula reportedly being backed by the European Community and Washington.
Late in April the government appeared confident that it had obtained all political support necessary to strengthen its insistence that Yugoslav ‘Macedonia’ comply with the three conditions adopted by the European Community in December. Namely, that Skopje abandon formal use of the name ‘Macedonia’ as being purely Greek from a cultural and historic point of view and because it implied territorial claims against Greece. Secondly, that it implicitly relinquish any claims against Greece and make changes to its Constitution accordingly. Thirdly, that it refrain from hostile propaganda against Greece.
Domestic political developments supporting Greek perseverance have included the support of anti-Skopje policies by the opposition parties – with the exception of the Greek Communis Party (KKE) which sees ‘imperialistic nationalism’ sweeping the country – by President Karamanlis, most of the press, an aroused populace, within the country and the large and influential Greek communities abroad. It also takes into account a growing ‘understanding’ of Greek sentiments – even begrudgingly – by its previously impatient and even outraged allies in NATO and the EC. The parliamentary vote of confidence won by the government on 17 April put an end, at least temporarily, to inner party feuding and persistent reports that Mr Mitsotakis’ administration was on the brink of collapse.
Paradoxically, the government and almost the entire opposition had previously supported Mr Samaras’ intransigence. His removal, ultimately, had more to do with inner party rivalries and the prime minister’s need to reassert himself against a potential rival – a move similar to the removal a few months earlier of Minister Miltiades Evert – rather than to substantial differences over Greece’s ‘Macedonian’ policy.
With the appointment of Ambassador Tzounis as Foreign Undersecretary, there were immediate reports that he favored de facto recognition of ‘Macedonia’ but not de jure, meaning that Athens would concede to the reality of the republic’s existence but not its legality or right to its controversial name. In other words, a sort of compromise would be made similar to that which existed between Greece and Israel for four decades. But with the opposition and the press screaming ‘treason’, the government quickly waffled, saying that it was only part of ‘multifacetted’ scenario report prepared by Mr Tzounis and had nothing to do with actual Greek intentions.
All this domestic political posturing aside, Greece, rightly or wrongly, feels it is in a position of strength regarding Skopje and should therefore not make concessions. The reason is that the neighboring republic constitutes the most impoverished part of Yugoslavia. It is not ethnically homogenous and at the same time is threatened by civil and nationalist strife within its borders. As a result, it is totally dependent on outside help, and on the EC in particular. Good relations with Greece, therefore, is the key to obtaining it.
Even though individual western countries might start recognizing ‘Macedonia’, Greece can veto its recognition by the European Community as a whole. This means that it cannot receive any financial aid from the Community or develop any meaningful relations with it. Even those countries that want to help ‘Macedonia’ know that they will have to do so at the risk of upsetting Greece. That could be risked, but ‘Macedonia’ would have little to offer such countries as compensation.
Greece holds the overwhelming military advantage, if it ever came to a showdown between the two sides, and Macedonia’s indirect threat that it will seek Bulgarian and Turkish assistance is not convincing. An increase in these two countries’ influence would be resisted by Serbia and Greece, and would be looked upon unfavorably by the West’s concern over growing Moslem involvement in the Balkans. Skopje benefits indirectly from the tourist and commercial traffic that passes through on its way to and from Greece and the Middle East in general. A closure of the Greek-Macedonian borders and the imposition of a limited blockade from the south would make its economic survival even more precarious.
Greece, on the other hand, has to consider certain disadvantages: A closure of borders would greatly damage Greek interests. Its dependence on motorist tourist traffic from western Europe, and for the export by road of more than half its entire produce, is a very high price to pay. Tellingly, Industry and Energy Minister Andreas Andrianopoulos warned that Greece could not afford to try to hold a border that stretches “from the Aegean islands to Albania”. Defence Minister Ioannis Varvitsiotis in similar vein said that a closure of the border with ‘Macedonia’ would necessitate an increase in compulsory military service. Nevertheless, and to face all eventualities, Greece has already developed alternate routes for tourist and commercial traffic, even though costlier, through Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It has also increased its sea traffic to and from Italy.
Greece, however, risks permanently damaging its relations with Albania, Skopje and Bulgaria. These are countries whose cooperation it needs to fend off growing Turkish influence in the Balkans. It also risks alienating its western partners, which are anxious to see the situation in the former Yugoslav republics stabilized. They are not happy with the Greek-Serbian axis or similar though informal alliance that has been created in the region.
Finally, Greece has to weigh as well the interesting possibility that a change of name for Skopje could signal the collapse of the government of President Kiro Gligorov. This could unleash further ethnic and nationalist strife with unexpected results.
Having considered the pros and cons of insisting on a hardline policy over the Macedonian issue, Greece so far has obviously concluded that it can afford to take the risk. However, its long-term optimism seems to stem from the prediction that ‘Macedonia’ might dissolve from within because of the potential ethnic turmoil and the territorial and nationalist pressure from its other neighbors, Serbia, Albania and Bulgaria.
The republic has a precarious ethnic homogeneity. Skopje’s own census of 1991 claims that of a total 2 million population, 1.5 million or 75 percent are ‘Macedonians’. This constitutes only 6.5 percent of the total Yugoslav federation. Greece claimed in April that even this figure includes a sizeable ethnic Greek minority.
A more independent international survey of the Yugoslav republic claims that 67 percent are ‘Macedonians’, 20 percent Albanians, 4.5 percent Turks, 2.3 percent Serbs, 2.2 percent Romanians and 2 percent Moslems.
Greek pressure aside, Skopje also feels immediately threatened by Bulgaria and by Serbia. The latter also sees ‘Macedonia’ as an artificial entity created by Tito to limit Serbia’s strength and influence within the old Yugoslav Federation, and it often refers to the region as ‘southern Serbia’. Bulgarian nationalists, in turn, see ‘Macedonia’ as part of a ‘Greater Bulgaria’.
More ominously pressing for Skopje is the very large Albanian minority. It has recently called for autonomy and union with the Albanian-dominated region of Kosovo in Serbia, under the historic name of ‘Illyria’. The first serious signs of Albanian unrest against Skopje’s central authority manifested themselves last month.
With such wrenching tensions pulling Skopje in at least three different directions, Athens feels that it can certainly afford to insist on its central demand for a change of name for ‘Macedonia’. Time, it feels, is on its side.
