ON October 18 the Government announced that Greece had accepted the terms of the latest NATO proposals for the country’s reintegration into the military wing of the alliance. Greece left the military branch of NATO on August 4, 1974 in the wake of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The country’s reentry was greeted with enthusiasm by other members of the alliance. In Greece, however, the announcement was received with considerable caution and even hostility. The chief objections were that the reason for Greece’s withdrawal — the military occupation of 38% of Cyprus by Turkey – had not been resolved and the fact that important details regarding the operational command of the sea and air space over the Aegean were not revealed.
In a recent interview, historian Thanos Veremis, maintained that the continuing imbalance between Greece and Turkey within the framework of NATO was established at the outset when Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in 1952:
The entire post-war orientation of Greek defense was based on the ‘U.S. credo that Greece’s main security concern was of an internal rather than an external nature. According to a National Security Report of 1949, Greece should have ‘a military establishment capable of maintaining internal security in order to avoid communist domination,’ while Turkey was designated with ‘a military establishment of sufficient size and effectiveness to insure her continued resistance to Soviet pressures.’ The Greek Army was therefore primarily supplied and organized to face the communist threat from within. A modification of the original report, appearing two years later, included an external operational assignment for the Greek forces but it made it clear that Greece would not be supplied with the necessary material to repel a foreign attack and furthermore that the United States could make no commitment to come to the aid of her ally if faced with an external attack. Greece was nevertheless expected ‘through certain limited accessories to cause some delay to Soviet and satellite forces in case of global war.’
Given the allocation of defense roles between Greece and Turkey, it is not difficult to assess the implication of their joint entrance into NATO on the former’s security. Whereas Greece was primarily geared to face her internal threat and ill-equipped to resist a Soviet attack, she was expected to aid Turkey which was presumably the primary target in the Balkans, at the risk of attracting enemy reprisals.
Q. On what basis were these quite different roles drawn?
A. It was a result of historical circumstances that came about during World War II and its aftermath. Since Ataturk, Turkish diplomatic policy has followed a consistent and successful course of aloofness and self-interest. Although she signed a treaty of affiliation with Britain in October, 1939, she kept out of that struggle and has played as passive and independent a role as possible in East-West relations since.
By contrast, Greece joined the Allied cause even without a treaty of alliance with Britain and invited attack by the Axis in her rejection of Italian demands. The result was Axis occupation and a subsequent Civil War between Communists and non-Communists in which America’s role via the Marshall Plan became decisive. Hence there developed in Greece a situation in which an outside power was needed to settle an internal affair which, in a sense, made it captive. Turkey never had to face occupation or civil war and therefore did not become dependent on a foreign power. Hence the distinction within the framework of NATO that Turkey was to be equipped to combat an external power and Greece an internal one. For this reason, Turkey has always had greater importance than Greece insofar as NATO defense policies are concerned.
Q. How has this greater dependence on the part of Greece affected its relations with NATO and Turkey?
A. In the first place it has allowed an attitude to arise that the West will not lose Greece but can lose Turkey. Hence, in case of friction between the two countries, it does not become a choice of holding onto one or to the other, but of holding onto Greece and Turkey or onto Greece alone. This has allowed Turkey to follow “a hard-to-get” role which it has pursued very successfully.
Q. How has this greater dependence of Greece on the USA affected the relations between the two countries?
A. Mostly negatively. A good relationship depends on relative autonomy. Over-dependence has been bad for Greece, bad for the U.S. and bad for the relationship. It ends up with something like the Colonels which brought Greek-American relations to their lowest point. Before the Junta, anti-Americanism came from expected quarters (leftists, etc.). During the Junta and after, a new, broader anti-Americanism appeared based on a kind of nationalism which conservatives felt as well.
Q. Will Greece’s re-entry in the military wing of NA TO increase this?
A. It greatly depends on Greece’s attitude towards the negotiations that will follow re-entry. If Greece acts in the old way: in a spirit of over-dependence, as belonging in an unqualified way to the West, in a belief that something may not be worth fighting for, then re-entry is a bad thing.
Q. What did Greece accomplish after pulling out of NATO in the first place ?
A. Very little. In November 1974 the U.N. Assembly passed a unanimous resolution urging a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus and a return of all refugees to their homes in safety. This resolution was endorsed by the Security Council in December — a moral consolation. But the proposals were all ignored by Turkey.
Q. Did it help to generate the Congressional embargo on military hardware to Turkey?
A. I doubt it. That was an internal American affair; an opportunity for Congress to flex its muscle vis-a-vis the administration in a post-Watergate atmosphere. If the Greek lobby had some influence it was only in an American domestic context. One can go so far as to say that the Greek Government did not want the embargo. It sounds paradoxical, but the embargo marked a worsening of Greek-American, relations. Congress’s support of the Greek cause aroused an adverse reaction on the part of two presidential administrations. In fact, the whole embargo episode emphasized glaringly Greece’s heritage of over-dependence on the U.S.
Q. What proposals have been turned down by Greece with regard to control of the Aegean?
A. Submitting to Turkish operational responsibility the airspace of half the Aegean, which would include the sovereign airspace over certain Greek islands; conceding to a Task Force under rotating NATO command control of the Aegean Sea; endorsing a NATO-supervised channel through the center of the Aegean: all of these considerations mentioned in the Haig and Rogers Plans have been rejected by Greece and would be unacceptable to any Greek government for they would entail violations of Greece’s sovereign rights. As Prime Minister Rallis said in his Harvard speech in September 1979 when he was Foreign Minister: “Claims that could result in an enclavement of the Greek islands of the Eastern Aegean in a Turkish continental shelf and in a Turkish-controlled airspace are obviously unacceptable to Greece, all the more so since such claims have no basis either in International Law or in International practice.”
When it comes to sovereign rights, there are no first and second-class territories. The islands off Asia Minor are as much a part of Greece as, say, a piece of the Peloponnesus — as Florida is as much a part of the U.S. as California. It’s a funny thing, but when it comes to security matters, an outsider often doesn’t see what is obvious to an insider. Someone asked me once: “Why is Greece so concerned over these islands? They are so peripheral,” And I said, “Why don’t you hand Schleswig-Holstein over to Denmark?” He was surprised and I was shocked; he was, after all, a German!
Q. Why did Turkey choose to lift its veto on Greece’s reentry at this time?
A. There may have been some arm-twisting on America’s part. Also, the present regime of military officers in Turkey was in a better position to accept it. Being at the apex of the power pyramid, they were easier to convince. A civilian government would have been more circumspect: look what happened to Menderes.
Q. How might Greece’s reintegration into the military branch of NATO be advantageous to Turkey? A It would make Turkey’s strategic position more integral. Without Greece, there is a void in the flank of NATO that extends to Italy. I don’t think, however, that Turkey would ever imperil itself by taking sides in case of war. Its importance lies in its position as a monitoring base and in the generally held belief that it will not aid the enemy. It is a matter of negative advantage. In dealing with Turkey, the fact that they will not do something is your primary concern. But you can never be sure if they will do something for you actively. It is their passivity that you buy off by making concessions. I very much respect the consistency of Turkey’s foreign policy. With what they command in terms of resources and — with the exception of their provocative stance towards Greece — they have made the best possible moves in order to safeguard their own security. The one thing that altered their consistent aloofness was when Stalin decided to put pressure on them. This drove Turkey into NATO, something which Turkey would ordinarily never have done. She welcomes the aid she can get from NATO but is always ready to withdraw her services when she feels her self-interest imperiled. It might be apropos to mention here that it was during the period of the embargo that Russia offered Turkey economic aid, which she accepted. By doing so, Turkey clearly indicated to Congress that she could revert to other means in order to promote her interests.
Q. What options does Greece have now that she has reentered NATO?
A. Greece is probably better placed to hold protracted discussions with Turkey in regard to operational responsibilities over the Aegean. Turkey may accept the status quo ante with a limited control area lying just off her mainland, although this appears unlikely at the present moment. And, then, of course, Greece can, if pushed to the wall, withdraw from NATO again. In this case, she will follow the difficult path of going it alone. It will mean paying the bills for buying weapons outside NATO. At the same time, by doing so, she will be clearly saying that in no way can any other nation endanger the sovereignty of her islands, and if it does, that she will act in the way any nation will act when its sovereign rights are violated.
Q. Greece remains in NA TO what should her role be?
A. It should be based on a limited form of autonomy. Greece’s giving the USSR a contract for commercial ship repairing at the Neorion Shipyards on Syros last year is an example. It boosted morale and indicated to NATO that Greece too could pursue her own policy. It was valuable in showing that Greece was able to assert herself for once. Her good relations with certain Balkan states is another example of creative autonomy. The Government’s policy as “honest broker” with countries which are not such happy members of the Warsaw Pact is advantageous to NATO as well as to Greece.
Ultimately, however, Greece’s role in NATO depends on the relations between the US and USSR. Will the US resume a kind of detente and come to an agreement on arms limitation, or will it all go into the waste basket? Or will a new sort of cold war period emerge? There are increasing economic difficulties on both sides. The USSR has projected its military power in the past because of its economic weakness. The US, on the other hand, did not have to compete at that level because it was secure on the economic side. Will its present financial problems and its dependence on imported oil make it militant, too? The USSR is fairly self-sufficient now, but in ten years’ time it may be as dependent on oil from the Middle East as the US is now. That is where, most likely, the confrontation will take place.
The ability of Greece to conduct an autonomous foreign policy will be determined to a certain extent by external factors over which she has little control. There is always, however, a margin for independent action which may be enhanced or restricted by domestic factors.
Thanos Veremis was born in Athens in 1943. He studied Political Science in the USA (B.A., M.A.) and Modern History in England (D.Phil. Oxon). Since 1977 he has been lecturer of Modern Greek History at the Pantios School of Political Science. In 1978-79 he was a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Co-editor of four volumes of The History of the Hellenic World, he has published articles in many journals.
His latest book, Greek Security Considerations, is a concise yet comprehensive account of how domestic and international factors have contributed to the formulation of Greece’s security policies. The publication is particularly timely as Greece re-enters the military wing of NATO.
